J.J. Prescott, of Michigan, and Jonah Rockoff, of Columbia Business, have posted a very interesting empirical study concerning the efficacy of sex offender registration and notification laws on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In recent decades, sex offenders have been the targets of some of the most far-reaching and novel crime legislation in the U.S. Two key innovations have been registration and notification laws which, respectively, require that convicted sex offenders provide valid contact information to law enforcement authorities, and that information on sex offenders be made public. Using detailed information on the timing and scope of changes in state law, we study how registration and notification affect the frequency of sex offenses and the incidence of offenses across victims, and check for any change in police response to reported crimes. We find evidence that registration reduces the frequency of sex offenses by providing law enforcement with information on local sex offenders. As we predict from a simple model of criminal behavior, this decrease in crime is concentrated among local victims (e.g., friends, acquaintances, neighbors), while there is little evidence of a decrease in crimes against strangers. We also find evidence that community notification deters crime, but in a way unanticipated by legislators. Our results correspond with a model in which community notification deters first-time sex offenses, but increases recidivism by registered offenders due to a change in the relative utility of legal and illegal behavior. This finding is consistent with work by criminologists suggesting that notification may increase recidivism by imposing social and financial costs on registered sex offenders and making non-criminal activity relatively less attractive. We regard this latter finding as potentially important, given that the purpose of community notification is to reduce recidivism.
As Dan Filler at Faculty Lounge notes, one of the most interesting findings is that the laws seem to work best as a deterrent for potential criminals rather than as a means of discouraging sex offender recidivism:
To the degree that individual offenders have control over their actions, notification functions as a deterring punishment (notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court has happily embraced the fiction that Megan's Law isn't punishment at all). To the degree that the an individual's conduct really is beyond rational control, offenders will reoffend notwithstanding the existence of registration and notification laws. (It remains possible that notification empowers potential victims - that is a separate and complicated issue.)
This provides a real dilemma for supporters of registration and notification laws. Citing Prescott and Rockoff's study to show the value of these laws undermines the legal fiction that has been created that registration and notification are not a form of punishment. On the other hand, there is an equal dilemma for those attacking these laws: they may be able to buttress their legal attacks that registration and notification are punishment, but they may have to concede the laws serve an important law enforcement function.
Michael Connelly raises a notable objection at Sentencing Law & Policy to the article:
The authors use reported offenses as their base but deal poorly with the likelihood that the increased attention to these crimes will lead many victims not to report. Their section on this possibility is very cursory and ignores the simple measure of looking at reports by victim before and after institution of the laws. Their results on their face would be exactly what we would predict if the often feared failure to report "Dad," "Unc," or Coach or Reverend rose as a result of those individuals' likely subsequent vilification in the community. Interesting paper but more work is needed before accepting its results.
Connelly's objection has a fair amount of anecdotal support since many many victims and defendants have remarked that the plea bargaining process has been altered by the registration requirements that a guilty plea entails. I could imagine a similar dynamic could occur in the initial decision to report. I think the article is great overall although I'm still trying to digest all of the data. I highly recommend checking it out for yourself.
Recent Comments