Although several years old, I recently stumbled across this multimedia New York Times series discussing sex offenders and civil commitment. The articles are available in three parts: part 1 | part 2 | part 3. The multimedia feature can be viewed here. Though popular with legislators, the article finds doubts about the effectiveness of civil commitment.
August 30, 2010
May 23, 2010
Op-Ed: "When the Feds Decide Who's Sexually Dangerous"
Continuing our coverage of Comstock, I just finished reading this effective editorial at The Atlantic raising some concerns over the potential reach of the decision. The opinion piece also compares the voting blocs of Comstock (which dealt with federal civil commitment) and an earlier Supreme Court decision, Kansas v. Hendricks (which dealt with state civil commitment). In Comstock, Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion and Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, whereas in Hendricks, Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion (upholding the Kansas law) and Justice Breyer wrote the dissent. From the editorial:
The wide applicability of this statute and lack of procedural safeguards distinguish it from state civil commitment laws previously upheld by the Supreme Court (this argument is presented in convincing detail in the NACDL amicus brief). In 1997, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the court upheld a controversial Kansas statute providing for the civil commitment of people deemed likely to commit "predatory acts of sexual violence" due to "mental abnormalities" or "personality disorders." But at least the Kansas law applied only to people previously convicted or charged with specified sex offenses and provided for jury trials in which alleged future dangerousness would have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hendricks upheld the Kansas civil commitment scheme by a five-to-four vote, in a conventional liberal-conservative split. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion upholding the law, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy; Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens. In Comstock, however, the majority and dissent switched sides. Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, upholding a federal civil commitment statute that's less protective of individual rights than the state statute he would have struck down (he was joined by Ginsberg, Stevens, and Sotomayor; Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito concurred). Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, joined by Scalia.
What accounts for this switch? In Comstock, the court didn't address due process challenges to the federal civil commitment scheme; it was reviewing a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that struck down the federal statute as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power, without reaching questions about due process (or other individual rights). So, putting individual rights issues aside, Justice Breyer adopted the expansive view of federal authority advocated by Solicitor General Kagan. (At the Volokh Conspiracy, Orin Kerr described Kagan's position as "shockingly broad: She argued that the Constitution gives the federal government the general power 'to run a responsible criminal justice system,' and that anything Congress plausibly thought a part of running a 'responsible criminal justice system' was within the scope of federal power.") Justices Thomas and Scalia, in keeping with a more literal, or originalist, reading of Article I congressional authority, and a view of the federal government as one of explicitly enumerated powers, would have denied the federal government civil commitment powers similar to those they afforded the states.
So there is some logic to these oddly contrasting positions represented by Justices Breyer and Thomas in their reviews of state and federal civil commitment statutes, respectively. Technical, constitutional arguments aside, however, I do wonder how Justices Thomas and Scalia would explain, in lay terms, why they oppose federal power to detain people deemed "sexually dangerous" in civil commitment proceedings but support federal power to criminalize mere possession or even false advertising of child porn, imposing long sentences on people who have never committed or even been suspected of committing any actual sexual offenses.
In any case, the court may get another chance to review the federal civil commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Act. The Comstock case will return to the Fourth Circuit, where, as Justice Breyer observed, Graydon Earl Comstock (et al) may raise due process, equal protection claims or any other individual rights claims on which the court has not yet ruled. But even if the case eventually wends its way back to the Supreme Court, and even if Justice Breyer switches sides again and somehow takes four of his colleagues with him, much damage has been done. Federal criminal jurisdiction has expanded dramatically in the last few decades, with the blessings of conservatives and liberals alike. Now, thanks to the ruling in U.S. v Comstock, that power seems practically infinite: federal authorities can imprison people indefinitely on suspicions of future dangerousness. It's not just suspected sex offenders or terrorists who are at risk.
Hendricks upheld the Kansas civil commitment scheme by a five-to-four vote, in a conventional liberal-conservative split. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion upholding the law, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy; Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens. In Comstock, however, the majority and dissent switched sides. Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, upholding a federal civil commitment statute that's less protective of individual rights than the state statute he would have struck down (he was joined by Ginsberg, Stevens, and Sotomayor; Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito concurred). Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, joined by Scalia.
What accounts for this switch? In Comstock, the court didn't address due process challenges to the federal civil commitment scheme; it was reviewing a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that struck down the federal statute as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power, without reaching questions about due process (or other individual rights). So, putting individual rights issues aside, Justice Breyer adopted the expansive view of federal authority advocated by Solicitor General Kagan. (At the Volokh Conspiracy, Orin Kerr described Kagan's position as "shockingly broad: She argued that the Constitution gives the federal government the general power 'to run a responsible criminal justice system,' and that anything Congress plausibly thought a part of running a 'responsible criminal justice system' was within the scope of federal power.") Justices Thomas and Scalia, in keeping with a more literal, or originalist, reading of Article I congressional authority, and a view of the federal government as one of explicitly enumerated powers, would have denied the federal government civil commitment powers similar to those they afforded the states.
So there is some logic to these oddly contrasting positions represented by Justices Breyer and Thomas in their reviews of state and federal civil commitment statutes, respectively. Technical, constitutional arguments aside, however, I do wonder how Justices Thomas and Scalia would explain, in lay terms, why they oppose federal power to detain people deemed "sexually dangerous" in civil commitment proceedings but support federal power to criminalize mere possession or even false advertising of child porn, imposing long sentences on people who have never committed or even been suspected of committing any actual sexual offenses.
In any case, the court may get another chance to review the federal civil commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Act. The Comstock case will return to the Fourth Circuit, where, as Justice Breyer observed, Graydon Earl Comstock (et al) may raise due process, equal protection claims or any other individual rights claims on which the court has not yet ruled. But even if the case eventually wends its way back to the Supreme Court, and even if Justice Breyer switches sides again and somehow takes four of his colleagues with him, much damage has been done. Federal criminal jurisdiction has expanded dramatically in the last few decades, with the blessings of conservatives and liberals alike. Now, thanks to the ruling in U.S. v Comstock, that power seems practically infinite: federal authorities can imprison people indefinitely on suspicions of future dangerousness. It's not just suspected sex offenders or terrorists who are at risk.
May 21, 2010
SCOTUSblog Recap of Comstock
As usual, SCOTUSblog has an excellent recap of the Comstock opinions written by Stanford Law Student Eric Hansford. From the post:
The respondents in this case are federal prisoners who were about to be released when the government instituted civil commitment proceedings against them under Section 4248. When the respondents challenged (among other things) the constitutionality of the government’s actions, the district court held (again, among other things) that the statute exceeded Congress’s powers under Article I of the Constitution, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on this ground.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and yesterday it reversed. In the majority’s view, “five considerations, taken together,” compel the conclusion that Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact Section 4248.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. In a separate opinion, he emphasized that the Necessary and Proper Clause has limits, and he sought to distance himself from what he regarded as some of the Court’s broadest language. In particular, he underscored that the “rational relationship” test at issue here is much more demanding than the “rational basis” test used in due process cases.
Justice Alito also concurred in the judgment. In his view, there is a “substantial link” between Section 4248 and Congress’s enumerated powers, thereby rendering the statute a necessary and proper means of implementing federal criminal law statutes authorized by Congress’s other enumerated powers.
May 19, 2010
Questions Left Unanswered By Comstock
Although the U.S. Supreme Court definitively ruled that the federal government has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to keep "sexually dangerous persons" in custody after the expiration of their sentence, both the majority and dissenting opinions noted some issues left unresolved by the decision. From Justice Breyer's opinion:
In resolving [the question presented], we assume, but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution -- such as the Due Process Clause -- do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances. Cf. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In other words, we assume for argument's sake that the Federal Constitution would permit a State to enact this statute, and we ask solely whether the Federal Government, exercising its enumerated powers, may enact such a statute as well. On that assumption, we conclude that the Constitution grants Congress legislative power sufficient to enact § 4248.
This seems to me an odd way to frame the argument, since it is established that states can act in ways in which the federal government cannot. Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion also mentions the many questions left unanswered by the Comstock decision, although he choose to articulate the questions in laundry list fashion. From Justice Thomas' opinion:
The Court’s newly minted test cannot be reconciled with the [Necessary and Proper] Clause’s plain text or with two centuries of our precedents interpreting it. It also raises more questions than it answers. Must each of the five considerations exist before the Court sustains future federal legislation as proper exercises of Congress’ Necessary and Proper Clause authority? What if the facts of a given case support a finding of only four considerations? Or three? And if three or four will suffice, which three or four are imperative? At a minimum, this shift from the two-step McCulloch framework to this five-consideration approach warrants an explanation as to why McCulloch is no longer good enough and which of the five considerations will bear the most weight in future cases, assuming some number less than five suffices. (Or, if not, why all five are required.) The Court provides no answers to these questions.
Perhaps this is an inevitable consequence of a major decision. In the oral arguments for District of Columbia v. Heller for example, (which also left many questions unanswered) Chief Justice Roberts appeared in favor of having these questions answered gradually over time. From the oral argument transcript:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are proposed, "compelling interest," "significant interest," "narrowly tailored," none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard. . . I'm not sure why we have to articulate some very intricate standard. I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up. But I don't know why when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?
May 17, 2010
Comstock Roundup
News media and the blogosphere are abuzz with discussion of the Comstock case and its future implications. Here is a round up of the media and blog coverage (in no particular order): Associated Press (1, 2, video), USA Today, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Volokh Conspiracy (Volokh, Volokh, Barnett, Adler, Somin), Sentencing Law & Policy (1, 2, 3, 4), SCOTUSblog, Constitutional Law Prof Blog, ABA Journal, TIME, Cato @ Liberty, Los Angeles Times (1, 2), CBS News, ABC News, CNN, AFP, MSNBC, Business Week, National Public Radio, Christian Science Monitor.
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