There has been a lot of federal appellate court action in relation to SORNA lately (I'll be covering the 8th Circuit's notable Howell opinion later today). Normally, the cases go in favor the government. However, when the defendant wins at the district court level, the basis is usually the lack of federal jurisdiction or an Ex Post Facto Clause issue. The 11th Circuit, in a split decision, in U.S. v. Dodge, issued an opinion in favor of the defendant that I can't make much sense of. From the opinion:
After pleading guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470, for transferring
obscene material to a minor,1 Matthew Mason Dodge (“Dodge”) appeals from the
part of the district court’s judgment that requires him to register as a Tier I Sex
Offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”),
42 U.S.C. § 16911. We reverse. Although Dodge transmitted obscene material to
persons he believed to be minors, he did not engage in conduct that constitutes a
“sex offense against a minor,” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I)(emphasis added), as we
understand that phrase. Although we do not adopt Dodge’s construction of
SORNA, we conclude that we are unable to distinguish Dodge’s behavior from
other behavior, involving distributing obscene material, that would support a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1470, but would not require Dodge to register as a
sex offender. Accordingly, Dodge also cannot be required to register.... Additionally, reading “other criminal offenses” to include federal offenses,
such as 18 U.S.C. § 1470, as suggested by the government, would turn the
language “State, local, tribal, foreign, or [specified] military offense” into
meaningless surplusage thereby further complicating an attempt to provide a
correct and coherent interpretation of the provision. For reasons given below,
however, we do not need to decide this issue of statutory interpretation because,
even if we assume that non-enumerated federal offenses, including violations of
18 U.S.C. § 1470, may qualify as “other criminal offenses,” Dodge still is not required to register.... The government, on the other hand, encourages us to reject a categorical
approach here, noting that the language in subsection (7)(I) calls for determining
the “conduct” of the defendant in question, not the “conviction,” as was the case in
Shepard. Id. Such a non-categorical approach was recently used by the 9th Circuit in United States v. Byum, 539 F.3d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 2008),9 where that Court
concluded that, “the best reading of the statutory structure and language is that
Congress contemplated a non-categorical approach...." Nonetheless, we do not have to decide whether or not to take a categorical
approach to reading the statute. This is because even if we do not adopt a
categorical approach requiring all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 to be sex
offenses against a minor in order to require registration, we still must be able to
articulate a principled statutory basis for requiring registration for some violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 but not for others. Here, even if we agree with the
government, and examine Dodge’s underlying conduct in this case, we are unable
to distinguish Dodge’s conduct from conduct that would also support a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 but which would not require registration under SORNA
because such conduct is not “by its nature a sex offense against a minor,” as
required by subsection (7)(I).
I apologize for the long block quote, but I wanted to give a fair sampling of the opinion since I am critical of it. I don't know how the 11th Circuit can say it is not deciding the categorical approach issue if it doesn't evaluate the specifics of the crime to determine if it is a "sex offense against a minor." In Byun (which is the proper spelling according to my records) the 9th Circuit case cited by the 11th Circuit as Byum, the court determined a person convicted of the importation of a person for prostitution should have the registration obligations evaluated on a non-categorical basis. Based upon the facts of that case, the crime was considered to be against a minor because juveniles were involved. In deciding this case, the 11th Circuit seems to have adopted a categorical approach without explicitly stating so.
Even beyond that initial decision, I'm not sure I follow the court's reasoning that the defendant's acts would not be a crime against a minor. Most of the attempted federal sex crimes cases these days involve stings where there is no "real" child involved. Yet, I would be amazed if persons convicted of those crimes were not intended to be subject to the registration requirements of SORNA. I think the dissent has the much better argument in this case:
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that SORNA permitted a noncategorical
approach with regard to the age of the victim as applied to a “specified
offense against a minor.” 539 F.3d at 991. In doing so, the court contrasted the
language of § 16911(5)(A)(i), which defines a sex offense as having “an element
involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another,” with the language of §
16911(5)(A)(ii), which definition of “specified offense against a minor” contains
no reference to the crime’s elements. Most critically, one statutory definition of “specified offense against a minor” is “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex
offense against a minor.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I) (emphasis added). Thus, the
court concluded that for SORNA purposes, it is the underlying conduct that
matters and not the elements of the conviction statute. Although it noted that the
statute creates a “modicum of ambiguity” given the use of the word “convicted” at
the outset (as opposed to the term “conduct”), the court determined that the “best
reading of the statutory structure and language is that Congress contemplated a
non-categorical approach as to the age of the victim in determining whether a
particular conviction is for a ‘specified offense against a minor.’” Byun, 539 F.3d
at 992. The court also noted that SORNA’s legislative history “fully support[ed]
this conclusion.” Id. at 992-93.... Like the Byun circumstances, Dodge’s plea reveals the underlying facts
supporting his conviction. Dodge transmitted nude photos of himself, including
some of him masturbating, to girls he thought were 13 years old. Dodge also used
a web camera to broadcast himself masturbating. In my view, a 34-year-old man
using a web camera to broadcast sex acts to a 13-year old girl clearly constitutes
“criminal sexual conduct involving a minor” or “conduct that by its nature is a sex
offense against a minor.” 5 Thus, the non-categorical approach requires the
registration of Dodge’s crime as a “sex offense” under SORNA even if other
conduct chargeable under 18 U.S.C. § 1470 would fall outside SORNA’s reach.
This case seems like a good candidate for en banc rehearing. The 11th Circuit needs to take a clearer stance on whether it is taking a categorical approach to crimes under SORNA and it needs to clean up the reasoning of the panel decision.
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