Sentencing Law and Policy reports that the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that amendments to the state's sex offender registration and reporting law apply retroactively and do not violate prohibitions on ex post facto laws. The decision itself (which split 4-3) is here and an official press release is here. The Columbus Dispatch has more. From the official press release:
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice O’Connor affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that applying the S.B. 5 sex offender classification, registration and community notification requirements to [the defendant] did not violate the ex post facto provision of the U.S. Constitution or the retroactivity provision of the Ohio Constitution.
Justice O’Connor noted that in its 1998 Cook decision, the Court had already upheld retroactive application of the 1996 sex offender registration statute on the basis that the classification, registration and notification requirements it imposed on prior offenders were remedial rather than punitive in nature. In reviewing [the defendant]’s claims based on the 2003 version of the same statute, she wrote, the Court’s task was therefore to review the S.B. 5 amendments to R.C. Chapter 2950 and determine whether those changes reflected a change in the legislature’s intent from the protection of the public to punishment of offenders.
Analyzing in turn each of the amended sections of R.C. Chapter 2950 requiring an offender’s classification, periodic registration with law enforcement and community disclosure, Justice O’Connor found that in each instance the changes imposed by S.B. 5 reflected the same intent to protect the public and prevent future sex crimes as the earlier version of the statute analyzed in Cook.
Berman highlighted the assertion of the dissent that the statute under review was different than that reviewed in the prior Cook case:
Although the majority continues to rely on State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 700 N.E.2d 570, the first case that considered retroactive application of R.C. 2950.09(B), R.C. Chapter 2950 has been amended. The simple registration process and notification procedures are now different [and] R.C. Chapter 2950 has been transformed from remedial to punitive.
The dissent went through several differences between the original statute and the new one. Some are a bit nitpicky, but I think the personal appearance requirement difference is notable. In the USSC decision in Smith v. Doe, the Court considered the lack of personal appearences in the statute was a notable part of finding the statute was regulatory. Still, the Ohio state court basically mirrors the pattern at the federal level of courts treated all sex offender registration statutes as the same. However, some of these laws are definitely not like the others.
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