District Court Finds 30 Year Mandatory Minimum in AWA Unconstitutional

It is very rare to see the 8th Amendment applied in favor of the defendant in non-death case. However, Judge Beverly Martin, of the Northern District of Georgia, in U.S. v. Farley , did just that. The Court held that:

... a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence for Mr. Farley, under the specific facts of his case, is so grossly disproportionate to his crime as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.... [T]he court finds it relevant that Mr. Farley committed no sexual act with a child, and that he was a first time offender with no evidence in the record that he is anything other than a low risk for repeating his crime. While Mr. Farley’s crime is deplorable, it is far less grave than crimes committed by perpetual offenders that remain a demonstrated threat to the public, or crimes that result in loss of or emotional devastation to a person’s life.

While I think it is refreshing to see a Court seriously consider an 8th Amendment challenge in a non-death case, I'm a bit confused by the court's reasoning in places. In discussing the statute, Judge Martin interpreted the legislative history as follows:

In the court’s view, the drafters’ use of “AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN” does not make it clear that the amendment applies to Mr. Farley’s crime of “cross[ing] a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years.” The court’s reading of the Bill alone suggests that the 30-year minimum applies only to aggravated sexual abuse. The Committee Reports accompanying the Bill are the same. The Senate Report states that the Bill includes enhancements such as “mandatory assured penalties for crimes of violence against children, including . . . a mandatory 30 year penalty for anyone who commits aggravated sexual abuse against a child.” S. Rep. No. 109-369, Dec. 8, 2006, Ex. A to Reply Br., at 2 (emphasis added). The House Report similarly provides that Section 2241 would be amended to “impose a mandatory minimum penalty of 30 years to life for knowingly engaging in a sexual act with either a child less than 12 years old, or a child that is 12-16 years old by using force or intoxicants if the perpetrator is at least four years older than the child.” H. Rep. No. 109-218, Ex. B to Reply Br., at 1 (emphasis added).

If the Court truly felt this was the case, then I'm confused why the opinion was not simply issued on statutory grounds (and thus avoiding the constitutional question).It's not that I don't find the Court's 8th Amendment analysis to be interesting and well argued; I just wonder why the judge didn't limit her ruling to statutory grounds by holding that the mandatory minimum didn't apply to Farley. Perhaps I have missed something in my initial quick read. Either way, the opinion is a very interesting read!

Comments

[Daniel]

Corey. I think it's actually worse than that. The problem with her opinion is that if she truly believes in the facts outlined in the sentencing portion of the opinion, he never should have been convicted of any crime at all. One of the most basic elements of the law is that there must be a case or controversy that results in actual harm. Yet she specifically states, "No harm was suffered." That statement is not qualified in any way. If that is true, upon what factual foundation did she convicted him of the offense? If he intended to have sex with the fictional child, then it is at least plausible to argue that some harm was suffered, if not directly by the child then by the community at large because of his perverted will. But there had to be harm somewhere for him to commit a crime, and yet she says there was none.

Sorry, that's just stupid.

[Guy]

@ Daniel:

Maybe I'm not understand what you're saying clearly enough (and that is a definite possibility), but the following is from page 11 of the opinion:

The Government also contends that the fact that no child was harmed should
not be considered in evaluating the gravity of the offense. It cites several cases that permit convictions and sentences for child crimes where the “victim” is an undercover agent. The court in no way questions Congress’s authority to punish actors who have not fully consummated a crime. Nor does this court misunderstand the legislative objective of allowing the criminal justice system to intervene before the actual crime is committed. The question before the court relates only to punishment — and whether the punishment required by 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) shocks the conscience as applied to the actions undertaken, and the specific
crime committed by Mr. Farley here. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) requires a sentencing court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” which properly includes consideration of the harm (or no harm) done to the victim.

It would seem to me from the reading that the judge isn't saying that he shouldn't of been convicted of a crime - or rather that no crime had been committed - but rather that there had been no harm suffered as a result of his actions in light of the fact that the "victim" was an undercover LEO.

[Book38]

I am not a lawyer or a professor, and I may be wrong but, it seems as though the judges are deciding the AWA cases in this manner to show that the AWA is a piece of unconstitutional trash rather than a good measure for justice, law and order.

Again, I may be wrong at my interpretation, but if I were a judge, this would be the way I would communicate to the lawmakers that you need to be better informed and educated the next time to pass a knee jerk (get me a vote) law like the AWA.