Sex Crimes

Amicus Curiae Brief in Carr v. United States

Together, Doug Berman, Wayne Logan, and I authored an amicus brief on behalf of law professors in the case of Carr v. United States. Wherease the petitioner's brief primarily focused on the statutory interpretation issues in the case, our brief was solely concerned with the Ex Post Facto Clause claim. You can find the brief here.

"Putting a Stop to Congressional Overreach"

Reason Magazine has an interesting article supporting the Respondent in the upcoming United States v. Comstock case before the U.S. Supreme Court. The article also mentions the Cato Institute's amicus brief, which we previously blogged about and which is available here. From the article:

Later this term, the U.S. Supreme Court will have a great opportunity to remind Clyburn and his colleagues of those limits when it hears oral arguments in the case of U.S. v. Comstock. At issue is the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which empowers federal officials to order the indefinite civil commitment of "sexually dangerous" persons who have finished serving a federal sentence, or who are currently in the custody of the attorney general because they were found mentally incompetent to stand trial. In other words, the government isn’t willing to let these people back on the streets.

In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government argues that Congress possesses this authority under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States."

Yet as the text itself clearly specifies, any law passed under the Necessary and Proper Clause must also be tied to a specifically enumerated constitutional power, either one of the "foregoing powers" listed in Article I, Sec. 8, or one of the "other powers vested by this Constitution." As James Madison told the Virginia ratifying convention, the Necessary and Proper Clause "only extended to the enumerated powers. Should Congress attempt to extend it to any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by the clause."

So where among the "foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution" did Congress happen to find an explicitly enumerated power to indefinitely detain "sexually dangerous" prisoners?

The answer is: Nowhere. The Constitution provides no such authority. Indeed, as a superb friend of the court brief filed in the case by Georgetown law professor Randy Barnett makes clear, "However well intentioned Congress may have been, it had no power to legislate for the purpose of protecting the public from dangerous persons.... The Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent source of Congressional power."

"As it Turns Out, There Are Limits on Congress’s Power"

Ilya Shapiro (of the Cato Institute) has an interesting post discussing the upcoming Supreme Court argument in United States v. Comstock. The Cato Institute has also filed a brief in support of the Respondent Comstock. You may read the brief here. From the post:

In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. One provision of the law authorizes the federal government to civilly commit anyone in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whom the attorney general certifies to be “sexually dangerous.” The effect of such an action is to continue the certified person’s confinement after the expiration of his prison term, without proof of a new criminal violation.

Six days before the scheduled release of Graydon Comstock — who had been sentenced to 37 months in jail for receiving child pornography — the attorney general certified Comstock as sexually dangerous. Three years later, Comstock thus remains confined in a medium security prison, as do more than 60 other similarly situated men in the Eastern District of North Carolina alone.

Comstock and several others challenged their confinements as going beyond Congress’s constitutional authority and won in both the district and appellate courts. The United States successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case.

The government’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, is misplaced because that clause grants no independent power but merely “carries into execution” the powers enumerated elsewhere in that section. The commitment of prisoners after their terms simply is not one of the enumerated powers.

While the government justifies its actions by invoking its implied power “to establish a federal penal system” — itself a necessary and proper auxiliary to certain enumerated powers — civil commitment is unrelated to creating or maintaining a penal system (let alone any enumerated power). Nor can the law at issue fall under the Commerce Clause, because civil commitment involves non-economic intrastate activity.

I think the government's brief tries to take the Necessary and Proper Clause to places it should not go. However, I still think the government is going to win despite itself as the Court will choose a different rationale (with some Necessary and Proper Clause helping out) and uphold the statute. It is nice to see Cato writing a brief in the case as not many organizations are willing to write on behalf of a sex offender.

SCOTUS Schedules Oral Argument In Comstock For Jan. 2010

Thanks to SCOTUSblog, we see that the Supreme Court has scheduled the oral argument in a list of cases beginning in January 2010, including United State v. Comstock (resource page available here), which is scheduled for oral argument on January 12th. The Comstock case deals with the federal government's power to prolong the imprisonment of persons deemed "sexually dangerous" beyond their completed sentences. You may view the argument calendar here.

New Resource Pages

You might notice off to the left that Sex Crimes now includes resource pages for two significant Supreme Court cases related to the AWA. As with the Kennedy v. Louisiana Resource Page, I hope to keep both the Thomas Carr v. United States and United States v. Comstock Resource Pages up to date with links to materials from around the web. And you can expect significant coverage of both cases when the oral arguments are made and when opinions are entered.

KY Supreme Court Strikes Down Retroactive Application of Residency Restrictions

The Kentucky Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Baker, (opinion available here) has found the retroactive application of the sex offender residency restriction to be unconstitutional. From the Lexington Herald-Leader:

A state law limiting where registered sex offenders may live cannot apply to those who committed offenses before July 12, 2006, the day the law was implemented, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled Thursday.

The law prohibits sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of playgrounds, day-care centers and schools, and the law changed how the distance is measured.

The court, in a 5-2 decision, said the law is punitive and violates the ex post facto clause, or retroactive law, in the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from passing laws that increase punishment for old crimes. The restrictions will still apply to anyone convicted after July 12, 2006.

As of Thursday morning, there were 280 sex offenders in Fayette County, and six were not in compliance, according to the Fayette County Sheriff's Office. Sheriff Kathy Witt said some addresses are visited every day. Those who are incompliant are usually not living at the addresses listed for the individuals.

H/T: Sentencing Law & Policy.

SCOTUS Stays out of Catholic Sex Abuse Disclosure Case (for now)

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a request by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport to delay the court-ordered release of thousands of legal documents from priest sex-abuse lawsuits. The New York Times has more. From the WSJ.com Law Blog:

In a one-line opinion, the court on Monday rejected a request by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport to delay the release of thousands of legal documents from lawsuits filed against priests accused of child sex abuse.

The diocese still has another request before the court, asking the justices to hear arguments that release of the records would violate the First Amendment rights accorded to religious groups. But, writes the NYT, such a hearing appears unlikely after the court’s ruling on Monday.

A spokesman for the Bridgeport Diocese said in a statement: “We are disappointed that the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to extend the stay. For more than a decade, the Catholic Church in Bridgeport has addressed the issue of clergy sexual abuse compassionately and comprehensively. For now, however, the serious threat to the First Amendment rights of all churches and the rightful privacy of all litigants remain in jeopardy because of the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court. This, indeed, is regrettable.”

The NYT story explains that the records were obtained by plaintiffs in 23 lawsuits filed against the diocese and seven of its priests in the 1990s. They were sealed in 2001 after the diocese reached settlements with the plaintiffs, former altar boys and youth group members who said they were molested by priests in the 1960s, ’70s and early ’80s.

In 2002, The NYT filed suit, seeking the release of the records. In June, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld lower court rulings, ordering the documents released.

SCOTUS Grants Cert. In Carr v. United States

This week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carr v. United States (previously blogged about here and here), which raises several constitutional challenges to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). You may view the full order list here. From SCOTUSblog:

Docket: 08-1301
Title: Carr v. United States
Issue: Whether a person may be criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failure to register when the defendant’s underlying offense and travel in interstate commerce both predated the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s enactment ; whether the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes prosecution under § 2250(a) of a person whose underlying offense and travel in interstate commerce both predated SORNA’s enactment.

• Opinion below (7^th Circuit)
• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

Kansas Court Assuages Justice Scalia's Fears in his Lawrence Parade of Horribles

In 2003, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent in Lawrence v. Texas where he predicted that the decision would be used to strike down state laws against (amongst other things) bestiality. Recently, a helpful reader directed us to a new Kansas Appellate decision assuaging Scalia's fears by upholding a state law criminalizing bestiality in State v. Coman, 214 P.3d 1198 (Kan. App. 2009). In Coman, the defendant appealed his conviction for having sex with his girlfriend's Rottweiler, arguing that (1) the criminal sodomy statute is unconstitutional and (2) he should not be required to register as a sex offender. The opinion is available here.  New York Law School Professor Arthur S. Leonard has more coverage of this story over at his blog. From the opinion:

Joshua B. Coman appeals his conviction for criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(1) and the district court's order that he register as a sex offender, arguing that his conviction does not require registration under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) and that K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(1) is unconstitutional in criminalizing sex between a human and an animal. We reject Coman's arguments and affirm his conviction and registration order.

Upon entering her garage to access the freezer, the complaining witness reported seeing her ex-boyfriend Coman lying on the floor of the garage with his pants and underwear down around his ankles, his shirt pulled up, and her female Rottweiler lying beside him. When she turned on the light, Coman moved his hips away from the dog and quickly pulled his pants up. Coman then said he loved the dog, Yodi, and he told the witness, “I don't expect you to understand, but I had to see her one more time.”

When police arrived, a pat-down revealed Coman's penis remained erect and he had a bottle of personal lubricant in his left front pocket. Coman denied having intercourse with the dog, but he admitted that he tongue-kissed her and digitally penetrated her. A search of Coman's cell phone revealed several photos of dogs and one video clip of a man engaging in sexual intercourse with a canine.

Coman was charged with one count of criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(1), with sexual motivation requiring registration under K.S.A. 22-4902(c)(14). He pled guilty to this offense and was sentenced to 6 months in the county jail, to run consecutive to a Reno County sentence for similar conduct. He was also ordered to receive psychiatric treatment and to register as a sex offender under KORA.

Of course, a cynic might think that Justice Scalia never actually feared that bestiality laws were in jeopardy after the opinion in Lawrence was issued. And others of us are still wondering what laws against masturbation to which Justice Scalia was referring. 

Is SORNA Going to the Supreme Court?

SCOTUSblog's recent Petitions to Watch post, which lists cases that might be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, includes a case raising constitutional issues with SORNA. The case, which we previously blogged about, is from the Seventh Circuit with an opinion by Judge Posner. You may view the opinion here and the petition for writ of certiorari here. From the "reasons for granting the petition" section:

The Court should settle whether Congress meant SORNA to apply retroactively to persons whose underlying offense and interstate travel both predated enactment of the statute. The Seventh Circuit’s holding on this point conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals (as the court below acknowledged) and of numerous district courts. And that holding is wrong: It departs from the plain statutory text; misstates the congressional purpose; and disregards the presumptions against retroactivity, and in favor of lenity and the avoidance of constitutional questions, that have been consistently applied by this Court. Review of the decision below accordingly is warranted.

Because the Seventh Circuit decided the question of statutory interpretation as it did, it was required to resolve the important constitutional question whether retroactive application of SORNA’s criminal penalties violates the Ex Post Fact Clause. Its decision on that question also warrants review. The district courts are deeply divided on the question--although the government has managed to suppress creation of a conflict in the courts of appeals by failing to appeal in those cases where it has been unsuccessful. Particularly in light of substantial flaws in the Seventh Circuit’s constitutional analysis, this Court’s guidance on the issue is essential.

While I do think that the USSC should chime in as to SORNA's constitutionality, I'm not sure the Justices will be interested in hearing these particular issues. The Ex Post Facto issue related to travel before the enactment of the AWA will disappear over time and only affects a small number of defendants. Still, the petition bears watching.