In U.S. v. Valverde, the Eastern District of California held that Congress lacked the authority to enact SORNA because the Act could not be justified under by the Commerce Clause. This is how the order addressed the jurisdictional limitation of SORNA:
... § 2250 does possess a purportedly jurisdictional element, as it penalizes a person who is required to register under SORNA and knowingly fails to do so or to update his or her registration and who travels in interstate commerce. In this way, unlike the statutes considered in Lopez and Morrison, the section limits the class of those who can be penalized to only those who have traveled in interstate commerce. The problem, however, is that this jurisdictional hook still creates a class that is too broad for Commerce Clause purposes. Under the statute, a person may be prosecuted for failing to register in his home state, then crossing state lines and registering in the next state. The harm, therefore, may be entirely intrastate. Were this a sufficient jurisdictional element, there would be no limit to Congress’s ability to penalize any crime whatsoever, so long as the defendant at some point in the course of his life traveled across state lines. This appears to be a plain usurpation of the state’s police power; as the Court expressed in Morrison, there is “no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.” 529 U.S. at 618. As such, the jurisdictional language in § 2250 cannot alone render the statute valid under the Commerce Clause.
- United States v. Powers, 544 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
- United States v. Hilton-Thomas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1929 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
- United States v. Myers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99384 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
- United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)
- United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
- United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Mont. 2008)