I'll be updating my comprehensive list of AWA cases with summaries in the near future. In the meantime, Sentencing Law & Policy points us to an interesting opinion about the SORNA registration provisions of the Act:
Defendant John Henry Gill, convicted of a sex offense in 2003, moves this court for an order to dismiss the indictment charging him with failing to register as a sex offender during September and October 2006 — as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) of the recently enacted Sex Offender Registration Notification Act (SORNA). Mr. Gill alleges that, at least as applied to him, SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Mr. Gill raises two ex post facto challenges. He first argues that the Ex Post Facto Clause blocks any registration requirement for previously convicted offenders. He also argues that, even if SONRA could constitutionally be applied to him, it did not in fact apply to him; he failed to register before the Attorney General had promulgated Interim Rules making SORNA’s criminal provision applicable to persons convicted before its effective date. The court agrees with Mr. Gill’s second, narrow submission. Because SORNA did not apply to Mr. Gill until the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule in February 2007, and because his alleged failure to register predates the promulgation of that Rule, his indictment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the court grants Mr. Gill’s motion to dismiss....
This clear congressional purpose does not shed light on the narrow issue the court is considering — whether the Act applied to sex offenders before the Attorney General issued the interim rule in February 2007. After the Attorney General followed congressional direction and established the Rule, a “unified front” existed on sex offender registration around the country. Indeed, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Gill is now registered in the national sex offender registry. Thus, the narrow issue before the court is what to do with the historical fact that some sex offenders, like Mr. Gill, did not register before February 28, 2007, but registered after that date.
As the decision makes clear, this holding is limited to the interim period before the AG stated that the Act applied retroactively. However, I agree with Berman that even with this limitation, "there is a very significant split of district court authority on the Ex Post Facto issue on which the defendant in Gill prevails. Put more broadly [sic], Gill highlights that SORNA is a piece of legislation that seems likely to divide lower courts on various consequential issues."